Saddam wanted into exile, but Bush rather wanted his head

BTA,
the driving forces behind the sanctions regime were the US and the UK, that is the US. Are you aware that the sanctions regime, as harsh as it was, was absolutely unprecedented in international law, harsher even than the Versaille treaty imposed on Germany after WW-I? That they did drive it through the formal process at the UN is one thing, that they then vetoed any attempt at the UN to end or even ease the sanctions regime when everybody else was appalled and wanted it to end for humanitarian reasons is the other. To argue that initially there were others joining in face of that is a little bit silly in my view. While certainly the US and the UK weren't alone in the beginning, they certainly were in the end, for years.

My point about Saddam being evil is mockery, plain and simple, because with any other interpretation I cannot plausibly explain to my wondering eyes the insistence on Saddam being too untrustworthy to even consider him a negotiating partner, so that the US is off the hook with insisting on regime change. Too easy, intellectually lazy. My inner cynic reads it as an excuse for not having to say that he is simply universally despised. So what? It is one thing to hold the view Saddam deserved to be hanged. Along the line: It's bad, but it hits the right guy. He had it coming. No need to look too close. Absolved. No, not really. That view has no relevance to the question whether or not regime change as a policy goal was mandated towards Iraq. Indeed that point is where we fundamentally disagree. That would only hold water if it was about anti-Saddam policies and not anti-Iraq policies.

One cannot address reactions to a policy without looking at the policy causing them. Yes, Iraq indeed violated the NPT, at least in part for the reasons I lined out earlier. That was dealt with by the inspections regime, which by the way worked remarkably well (it's no accident that those WMD couldn't be found - they were destroyed). You really think that Iraq leaving the NPT would have caused US policy to shift one inch? Iraq's games with the inspection regime were to a large extent a reaction on US policies behind the sanctions regime. I don't know if I get you right, but in that light it appears odd to point out he didn't play by unfair rules imposed on him, and hold it against him, to go on suggesting that this is ok, say, because Saddam deserved it? It's bad, but it hits the right guy? He had it coming? No need to look too close? Absolved? That then would be confused thinking. The mess with Saddam and Iraq is a direct consequence of one and a half decade of bipartisan US regime change policies towards Iraq that went terribly wrong, probably as a result of the built in flaw of regime change as a policy goal that I mentioned in my last post. I think the case of Iraq is perfectly well suited as a study object in this regard.

[ October 04, 2007, 01:43: Message edited by: Ragusa ]

 

Careful what you want - Iran might be closer to "liberation" than you think. Mind you, there are imo a few states that are way more worthy of attention than it, even if we only go by the criterium of "liberty."

 

Codified for Oil

 

BTA,

It is not immaterial. The US never were satisfied with what Iraq s offered as proof. That was a matter of policy, rather than of Saddam's compliance or lack thereof. It was not so much a question of lack of cooperation but of the nature of the question asked. Iraqi compliance is utterly irrelevant to the question whether sanctions were to be lifted or not. The answer was no, period. You assume the US did play fair with Iraq and that he could ever be compliant. By design, he could not.

Irrespective of the blathering in the US, Saddam eventually did come clean, the inspectors were largely vindicated in their assessment that Saddam was disarmed and indeed – surprise, surprise – no WMD were found. But that couldn't satisfy ever new US accusations: "Ok, you could prove that program A ended, but what about program X? There is no program X. You're lying ..." etc. pp. There is in my view something as a frivolous accusation. Many of the claims made by the US about alleged Iraqi secret programs, such as those drones to spray germs over US cities, were pure fantasy. There was nothing ever found. So the US were just irrationally paranoid? I do not think so. There is a much simpler explanation.

At the very least since Bush took office, what the US did was to accuse Saddam of hiding something and then demanding him to counter that accusation. The catch - it is impossible to prove a negative, that is, to prove you have nothing. Because US diplomats aren't stupid, I presume they were well aware of that and that this was by design. It is pretty clear to me that the sole idea of the accusing Iraq of not cooperating offered a convenient excuse to maintain the sanctions, which were the instrument of choice to achieve regime change, and after 911, to justify the war of choice to topple Saddam. The US knew from Saddam's nephew Hussein Kamal that Irad actually had disarmed. They didn't care. I guess the idea behind still accusing Iraq of non compliance for good measure was the view that it wouldn't do much harm, as it hit the right guy, might accelerate regime change, and hey, maybe it's even true. Win-win!

 

Thesis: Ragusa hates America.
Antithesis: BTA hates the rest of the world.
Synthesis: Let's nuke everyone. Yes, including ourselves.

 

AMaster, I love you too.

BTA,
regime change in Iraq has been official US policy – under Clinton, with sanctions as the tool of choice – and under Bush – with war after 911 being the tool of choice. An excerpt of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998:

This isn't just some political babbling but an act of law. It can be summed up as representing the consensus view in US foreign policy cirles, Ds & Rs alike. That Bush eventually embraced the lunatic idea of invading Iraq to aventually achieve that elusive goal of regime change and use that as a means to transform the entire region is only the last silly consequence of a dysfunctional policy goal that has existed well before he took office. It gives testimony to how rigid the bipartisan US consensus, once formed, actually stays true to orthodoxy as far as foreign policy is concerned.

The implications of that bill are very simple: In case Saddam would have gotten a clean bill of health, getting his disarmament testified, he would be back in business and Iraqi sovereignty restored. That inevitable result of full compliance and an official policy goal of regime change don't add up. It is ridiculous to assume that Saddam has nobody to blame but himself because he could have complied. Him complying was incompatible with the policy goal of regime change; restoration of Iraqi sovereignty would have in fact rather strengthened his position domestically and made completely impossible that goal. It was thus unacceptable. I think it is plausible that the US went to some length to ensure that wouldn't happen. Saddam's record and image certainly made it easier for them to do that. The myth of Saddam's non-compliance serves that purpose quite well even today.

That said, when I appear wildly heretical as I apparently do I am not giving Saddam the benefit of a doubt - I merely deny it to the US. I try to be sober.

[ October 08, 2007, 22:51: Message edited by: Ragusa ]