Iraq, Iran, and the USA

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Something interesting I read on Strategic Forecasting yesterday:

The Unnoticed Alignment: Iran and the United States in Iraq
Nov 19, 2003

Summary

Iranian President Mohammad Khatami has quietly announced his recognition of the Iraqi Governing Council and acceptance of the U.S. timeline on the transfer of power in Iraq. The announcement speaks to a partnership that will direct the future course of Iraq. The alliance is of direct short-term benefit to both countries: The United States gains a partner to help combat Sunni insurgents, and Iran will be able to mitigate the long-standing threat on its western border. What is most notable is that, though there has been no secrecy involved, the partnership has emerged completely below the global media's radar.

Analysis

Iranian President Mohammad Khatami did something very interesting Nov. 17: He announced that Iran recognized the Iraqi Governing Council in Baghdad. He said specifically, "We recognize the Iraqi Governing Council and we believe it is capable, with the Iraqi people, of managing the affairs of the country and taking measures leading toward independence." Khatami also commented on the agreement made by U.S. Administrator Paul Bremer and the IGC to transfer power to an Iraqi government by June: "The consecration of this accord will help with the reconstruction and security in Iraq,"

This is pretty extraordinary stuff. The IGC is an invention of the United States. The president of Iran has now recognized the IGC as the legitimate government of Iraq, and he has also declared Iran's support for the timetable for transferring power to the IGC. In effect, the U.S. and Iranian positions on Iraq have now converged. The alignment is reminiscent of the Sino-U.S. relationship in the early 1970s: Despite absolute ideological differences on which neither side is prepared to compromise, common geopolitical interests have forced both sides to collaborate with one another. As with Sino-U.S. relations, alignment is a better word than alliance. These two countries are not friends, but history and geography have made them partners.

We would say that this is unexpected, save that Stratfor expected it. On Sept. 2, 2003, we published a weekly analysis titled An Unlikely Alliance, in which we argued that a U.S.-Iranian alignment was the only real solution for the United States in Iraq -- and would represent the fulfillment of an historical dream for Iran. What is interesting from our point of view (having suitably congratulated ourselves) is the exceptionally quiet response of the global media to what is, after all, a fairly extraordinary evolution of events.

The media focus on -- well, media events. When Nixon went to China, the visit was deliberately framed as a massive media event. Both China and the United States wanted to emphasize the shift in alignment, to both the Soviet Union and their own publics. In this case, neither the United States nor Iran wants attention focused on this event. For Washington, aligning with a charter member of the "axis of evil" poses significant political problems; for Tehran, aligning with the "Great Satan" poses similar problems. Both want alignment, but neither wants to make it formal at this time, and neither wants to draw significant attention to it. For the media, the lack of a photo op means that nothing has happened. Therefore, except for low-key reporting by some wire services, Khatami's statement has been generally ignored, which is fine by Washington and Tehran. In fact, on the same day that Khatami made the statement, the news about Iran focused on the country's nuclear weapons program. We christen thee, stealth geopolitics.

Let's review the bidding here. When the United States invaded Iraq, the expectation was that the destruction of Iraq's conventional forces and the fall of Baghdad would end resistance. It was expected that there would be random violence, some resistance and so forth, but there was no expectation that there would be an organized, sustained guerrilla war, pre-planned by the regime and launched almost immediately after the fall of Baghdad.

The United States felt that it had a free hand to shape and govern Iraq as it saw fit. The great debate was over whether the Department of State or Defense would be in charge of Baghdad's water works. Washington was filled with all sorts of plans and planners who were going to redesign Iraq. The dream did not die easily or quickly: Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was denying the existence of a guerrilla war in Iraq as late as early July, more than two months after it had begun. Essentially, Washington and reality diverged in May and June.

Fantasy was followed by a summer of paralysis. The United States had not prepared for a guerrilla war in Iraq, and it had no plan for fighting such a war. Search-and-destroy operations were attempted, but these never had a chance of working, since tactical intelligence against the guerrillas was virtually non-existent. All it did was stir up even more anti-American feeling than was already there. The fact was that the United States was not going to be in a position to put down a guerrilla war without allies: It had neither the manpower nor the intimate knowledge of the country and society needed to defeat even a small guerrilla movement that was operating in its own, well-known terrain.

At the same time, for all its problems, the situation in Iraq was not nearly as desperate as it would appear. Most of the country was not involved in the guerrilla war. It was essentially confined to the Sunni Triangle -- a fraction of Iraq's territory -- and to the minority Sunni group. The majority of Iraqis, Shiites and Kurds, not only were not involved in the guerrilla movement but inherently opposed to it. Both communities had suffered greatly under the Baathist government, which was heavily Sunni. The last thing they wanted to see was a return of Saddam Hussein's rule.

However, being opposed to the guerrillas did not make the Shiites, in particular, pro-American. They had their own interests: The Shiites in Iraq wanted to control the post-Hussein government. Another era of Sunni control would have been disastrous for them. For the Shiites -- virtually regardless of faction -- taking control of Iraq was a priority.

It is not fair to say that Iran simply controlled the Iraqi Shiites; there are historical tensions between the two groups. It is fair to say, however, that Iranian intelligence systematically penetrated and organized the Shiites during Hussein's rule and that Iran provided safe haven for many of Iraq's Shiite leaders. That means, obviously, that Tehran has tremendous and decisive influence in Iraq at this point - which means that the goals of Iraqi Shiites must coincide with Iranian national interests.

In this case, they do. Iran has a fundamental interest in a pro-Iranian, or at least genuinely neutral, Iraq. The only way to begin creating that is with a Shiite-controlled government. With a Shiite-controlled government, the traditional Iraqi threat disappears and Iran's national security is tremendously enhanced. But the logic goes further: Iraq is the natural balance to Iran -- and if Iraq is neutralized, Iran becomes the pre-eminent power in the Persian Gulf. Once the United States leaves the region -- and in due course, the United States will leave -- Iran will be in a position to dominate the region. No other power or combination of powers could block it without Iraqi support. Iran, therefore, has every reason to want to see an evolution that leads to a Shiite government in Iraq.

Washington now has an identical interest. The United States does not have the ability or appetite to suppress the Sunni rising in perpetuity, nor does it have an interest in doing so. The U.S. interest is in destroying al Qaeda. Washington therefore needs an ally that has an intrinsic interest in fighting the guerrilla war and the manpower to do it. That means the Iraqi Shiites -- and that means alignment with Iran.

Bremer's assignment is to speed the transfer of power to the IGC. In a formal sense, this is a genuine task, but in a practical sense, transferring power to the IGC means transferring it to the Shiites. Not only do they represent a majority within the IGC, but when it comes time to raise an Iraqi army to fight the guerrillas, that army is going to be predominantly Shiite. That is not only a demographic reality but a political one as well -- the Shiites will insist on dominating the new army. They are not going to permit a repeat of the Sunni domination. Therefore, Bremer's mission is to transfer sovereignty to the IGC, which means the transfer of sovereignty to the Shiites.

From this, the United States ultimately gets a force in Iraq to fight the insurrection, the Iraqi Shiites get to run Iraq and the Iranians secure their Western frontier. On a broader, strategic scale, the United States splits the Islamic world -- not down the middle, since Shiites are a minority -- but still splits it. Moreover, under these circumstances, the Iranians are motivated to fight al Qaeda (a movement they have never really liked anyway) and can lend their not-insignificant intelligence capabilities to the mix.

The last real outstanding issue is Iran's nuclear capability. Iran obviously would love to be a nuclear power in addition to being a regional hegemon. That would be sweet. However, it isn't going to happen, and the Iranians know that. It won't happen because Israel cannot permit it to happen. Any country's politics are volatile, and Iran in ten years could wind up with a new government and with values that, from Israel's point of view, are dangerous. Combine that with nuclear weapons, and it could mean the annihilation of Israel. Therefore, Israel would destroy Iran's nuclear capabilities -- with nuclear strikes if necessary -- before they become operational.

To be more precise, Israel would threaten to destroy Iran's capabilities, which would put the United States in a tough position. An Israeli nuclear strike on Iran would be the last thing Washington needs. Therefore, the United States would be forced to take out Iran's facilities with American assets in the region -- better a non-nuclear U.S. attack than an Israeli nuclear attack. Thus, the United States is telling Iran that it does not actually have the nuclear option it thinks it has. The Iranians, for their part, are telling the United States that they know Washington doesn't want a strike by either Israel or the U.S. forces.

That means that the Iranians are using their nuclear option to extract maximum political concessions from the United States. It is in Tehran's interest to maximize the credibility of the country's nuclear program without crossing a line that would force an Israeli response and a pre-emptive move by the United States. The Iranians are doing that extremely skillfully. The United States, for its part, is managing the situation effectively as well. The nuclear issue is not the pivot.

The alignment represents a solution to both U.S. and Iranian needs. However, in the long run, the Iranians are the major winners. When it is all over, they get to dominate the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. That upsets the regional balance of power completely and is sending Saudi leaders into a panic. The worst-case scenario for Saudi Arabia is, of course, an Iranian-dominated region. It is also not a great outcome for the United States, since it has no interest in any one power dominating the region either.

But the future is the future, and now is now. "Now" means the existence of a guerrilla war that the United States cannot fight on its own. This alignment solves that dilemma. We should remember that the United States has a history of improbable alliances that caused problems later. Consider the alliance with the Soviet Union in World War II that laid the groundwork for the Cold War: It solved one problem, then created another. The United States historically has worked that way.

Thus, Washington is not going to worry about the long run until later. But in the short run, the U.S.-Iranian alignment is the most important news since the Sept. 11 attacks. It represents a triumph of geopolitics over principle on both sides, which is what makes it work: Since both sides are betraying fundamental principles, neither side is about to call the other on it. They are partners in this from beginning to end.

What is fascinating is that this is unfolding without any secrecy whatsoever, yet is not being noticed by anyone. Since neither country is particularly proud of the deal, neither country is advertising it. And since it is not being advertised, the media are taking no notice. Quite impressive.

 

What a great analysis! The article is right - this is quite transparent (in typical American style) but no one is paying attention. But it neglects two important details.

1) Iraq's Shi'a population has natural ideological ties to Iran, but culturally, ethnically, and politically the two distinct. If democratization can stick in Iraq, then those differences will widen. During the Iraq-Iran war, some analysts predicted that the Iraqi Shi'a would support Iran, but instead Hussein's secularist pan-Arab ideology held the Iraqi Shi'a on Hussein's side. (The total Sunni domination of the government helped, too.) So even if the Iraqi Shi'a dominate the new government, we shouldn't assume Iran will have control. The Iraqi Shi'a are ambitious to make Iraq great, not to make a pan-Shi'ite conglomeration; and, since the Sunni population has much of the bureaucratic and technical training, the Shi'a politicians will have to make concessions to keep them cooperative.

2) The American gamble is that Iraq will be the one ideologically swallowing Iran, not the other way around. The US hopes that democracy will take root in Iraq and infect its neighbors, fomenting democratic reforms (or revolution). This is especially likely to occur in Iran, since so many pilgrims travel to holy sites in Iraq, a democratizing Afghanistan sits on Iran's other border, and Iran was the most democratic country in the region anyway. (Actually, it retains that honor 'til Iraq gets its new constitution.)

So I wouldn't say that America is looking at only the short-run - but rather looking so far into the long-run horizon that it is becoming far-sighted and missing dangers right in front of itself.

 

Llandon...a remarkable post. If the scenario you unveiled is truly happening, it bodes well for the future in the Middle East and America's relations there. I have one question, however...I have always been under the impression that the Iranian President was relatively powerless to form policy for his nation, the real power being held by the Mullah Ayatollah Khameini (sp), who has been unyeilding in the past in his anti-American stance. There have been times in the recent past when Khatami has sought to normalize relations with the US to no avail. I hope that this is not one of those times.

Again, great post .

 

That is interesting because I work with a marine, who commented about a month ago that he thought he would be getting "orders for Iran." When I asked him a few days ago, he simply said, "they were behaving themselves now." I guess so.

 

Iran has been moving in the right direction for quite some time now. The government has softened a lot and slowly but rather steadily they are moving towards democracy. Their quest for nukes is I think just a "final" little rebellion against the "west" and our "sionistic" agenda, nothing Iran will push very hard. I cant help but to as usual a little kick though, the reason I think this hasnt been a big news is that the US govt has no real interest in painting Iran up as a buddy and a non-threat. I think the current US regime wants to keep an "evil" Iran in reserve in case they need another war to further the agenda of the diehard neo-cons. Iran is a member of the axis of evil...

 

Iran will be the first democracy in this region, I am pretty convinced that this will be happening. They hit the rock bottom with a theocratic regime, like many countries did before. Yet, a former theocracy is a good ground for democratic development and they have a huge democratic development already. But it's still fragile and many articles I'ver read mentioned, that the US could endanger the democratic development in Iran with their more hostile stand and give the conservatives in Iran a possibiliy to strengthen their position with a "rally around the flag, enemy at the gates" drumming.

As for Khatami. My understanding is, that the majority of his former supporters and voters are unsatisfied with him, as his progressing much to slow. Surely slower as expected. I am not sure what to make of it. Maybe a very soft approach would be the best, to not alienate the clerics to much and make it easier for them to give away power down the road?

As for Iran-Al-Queda connections. I think it's like presuming presbyterians in the ranks of the dominicians. They are dead-set enemies and Iran is on the destruction list, I gather.

What I hope, is to see a approachment of the US to Iran and bury the hatchet, like many European countries already did. That I think would be a very good development.

 

The whole thing reminds me more the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact than the U.S.-Soviet Union alliance. Iran is trying to buy time in order to avoid a possible U.S. invasion and to reduce the international pressure for its nuclear program. Also, Iran, despite its current steps towards democracy, is still a theocratic state and like Soviet Union wanted to spread communism to the rest European countries, Iran wants to spread theocracy to its neighbours. With this agreement Iran manages to weaken its muslim religious enemies without spilling a single drop of its blood by letting the big western "devil" to do the dirty job and in the same time it builds the foundations of an islamic party's victory in the iraqi elections.

Sharon and its administration are extermists but I don't believe that they are stupid to launch a nuclear attack against Iran. Perhaps they will try to destroy iranian nuclear facilities with air raids like they did with the iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 but they will never use nukes.

 

Dude. Iran has definately been moving in the right direction, lately.

I totally hope they nuke someone. Or pull a 3-mile-island at their enrichment plant. The desert gets really cold at night.

Clicking. Hot.

 

@ BOC i agree with most of your argument but i partly agree with this one

I don't think that Iran is as fundalmentalist as it used to be. But surely is eager to see that the whole region is indepented (meaning no foreign control ) and if possible governed by Muslim friendly goverments. I don't think they care if they are fundamentalistic states just to comply with the two requirments i mentioned above.